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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 04-3864
________________
BRIAN A. NYE,
                  Appellant
   v.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS;
TRACY W. JOHNS, Warden,
FCI Loretto
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Western District of Pennsylvania
(W.D. Pa. Civ. No. 04-80J)
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson
_______________________________________
Submitted For Possible Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
April 21, 2005
BEFORE: ALITO, McKEE and AMBRO, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed:    June 30, 2005)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Brian A. Nye appeals pro se from the order of the District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus to the extent he
2sought to compel Appellees to calculate his “good time” credit based on the sentence
imposed rather than the time served.
At the time of filing this appeal, Nye was serving a fifty-one month sentence at the
Federal Correctional Institution in Loretto, Pennsylvania.  Nye filed a petition for habeas
corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the District Court challenging the Bureau of
Prisons’ (“BOP”) change in policy related to the timing of the release of prisoners to
community confinement.  Nye subsequently filed a supplement to his habeas petition,
seeking to compel the BOP to calculate his good time credit based on the sentence
imposed rather than on the time he has served.  Upon recommendation by the Magistrate
Judge, the District Court granted Nye’s habeas petition with respect to the community
confinement issue and dismissed the claim related to the calculation of good time credit
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.  It is from this dismissal that Nye appeals. 
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We can affirm the
District Court on any basis supported in the record.  See Fairview Township v. EPA, 773
F.2d 517, 525 n.15 (3d Cir. 1985).  Our review is plenary.  See Bakhtriger v. Elwood, 360
F.3d 414, 417 (3d Cir. 2004).  The Commonwealth has filed a motion for summary
affirmance to which Nye has responded. 
Nye challenges the BOP’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1), which
provides that credit may be applied to a prisoner’s sentence based on “satisfactory
conduct.” The statute reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
3[A] prisoner who is serving a term of imprisonment of more
than 1 year other than a term of imprisonment for the duration
of the prisoner’s life, may receive credit towards the service
of the prisoner’s sentence, beyond the time served, of up to 54
days at the end of each year of the prisoner’s term of
imprisonment, beginning at the end of the first year of the
term . . .
18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1).  The BOP interprets this statute to allow fifty-four days of “good
time” credit for each year served by the prisoner.  28 C.F.R. § 523.20.  The BOP’s
formula for calculating good time credit accounts for the fact that the prisoner’s sentence
is incrementally shortened as good time credit is awarded each year.  See White v.
Scibana, 390 F.3d 997 at 1000-1001 (7  Cir. 2004) (explaining the BOP’s formula).  th
Nye argues that the placement of the word “beyond” in the phrase “beyond the
time served” means that good time credit should be added to the amount of time served,
rather than based on the amount of time served.  He next asserts that the phrase “term of
imprisonment” refers to the sentence as imposed and has the same meaning as when used
in the sentencing phase of a defendant’s trial or in the text of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines.  As a result of the BOP’s incorrect interpretation of this statute, Nye argues,
he is being deprived of good time credit to which he is entitled.
We have recently held that the phrase “term of imprisonment” in this statute is
ambiguous.  See O’Donald v. Johns, 402 F.3d 172, 174, 2005 WL 647669 at **2 (3d Cir.
March 22, 2005).  We need not dwell on this ambiguity, or on the meaning of “beyond the
time served,” however, as we further held in O’Donald that the BOP’s interpretation of §
3624(b) is reasonable.  See id.  Therefore, we defer to the BOP’s interpretation, as
required under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837,
844 (1984).
For the foregoing reasons, Nye’s arguments are foreclosed by our decision in
O’Donald; summary action is warranted based on this subsequent precedent. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  See Third Circuit LAR 27.4
and I.O.P. 10.6.
